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   Abstract  
The purpose of this paper is to explore the significance for legal thought of 
recent developments in evolutionary theory which are associated with the notion 
of ‘memetics’. ‘Memetics’ aims to account for processes of cultural 
transmission and change using a version of the ‘genetic metaphor’.  This is the 
idea that patterns of cultural evolution are closely analogous to those which 
occur in the natural world as a result of the interaction between genes, 
organisms and environments.  At a further, more ambitious level, the initial 
metaphor gives way to a search for mechanisms which unite biological and 
cultural evolution.  Identifying these general evolutionary mechanisms is part of 
a wide-ranging, interdisciplinary research agenda. 
 
 
JEL Codes: K22, K31 
 
 
Keywords: legal evolution, memes, path dependence, autopoiesis, employment 
contract, corporate governance 
 
Acknowledgements 
This paper is an amended version of a ‘Current Legal Problems’ lecture given at 
University College, London, on 18 October 2001 and subsequently presented to 
the Cambridge Realist Workshop on 28 January 2002.  I am grateful for 
comments received from John Armour, Fabio Carvalho, Michael Freeman, 
Oliver Goodenough, Geoff Hodgson, Kevin Laland, Clive Lawson, Tony 
Lawson, Tim Murphy, and William Twining.  I remain solely responsible for 













Further information about the ESRC Centre for Business Research can be found 
on the World Wide Web at the following address: www.cbr.cam.ac.uk. 
    
 
The case for looking closely at evolutionary theory from the viewpoint of law 
lies in part in the recent growth of interest in the idea of the ‘meme’ as an 
analogue to the gene in the social or cultural sphere.  The notion originates in 
the works of the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, in particular The 
Selfish Gene
1 and The Blind Watchmaker,
2 but its diffusion owes much to 
Daniel Dennett’s philosophical work, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea.
3  A ‘meme’ is 
understood to be a unit of cultural information, that is to say, a concept or idea 
that is shared within a population of individuals through social (as opposed to 
genetic) transmission.  The diffusion of memes is subject, in principle, to similar 
Darwinian principles of heredity, variation and selection as apply to genes.     
This is to argue that cultural forms develop according to a logic of cumulative 
evolution, through which marginal or incremental changes occur over time in a 
way which reflects selective, environmental pressures.  The basic evolutionary 
‘algorithm’ can thereby be applied to explain the emergence of complex social 
institutions as the result of an extended process of historical development.  
 
While there are many controversial issues arising from the use of the genetic 
metaphor outside the biological sciences, some can and should be set aside, at 
least for the purposes of the present discussion.  A memetic point of view does 
not require us to believe that human institutions, such as law, are shaped directly 
by genetic transmission.  On the contrary, memetics opposes this type of genetic 
reductionism by raising the possibility that there are evolutionary mechanisms 
which are specific to the cultural realm.
4  Here, ‘culture’ is broadly defined to 
include those human practices (of which law is one) which depend upon the 
existence of shared knowledge and understanding among a given population of 
actors.
5 If cultural and genetic evolution coexist, there are implications for 
‘meme-gene coevolution’, which are only just beginning to be explored.
6   
Consideration of the claims made by ‘evolutionary psychology’ to have 
identified a genetic basis for certain human behavioural traits and social 
institutions
7 will be part of this research programme.  However, for lawyers and 
social scientists, there is a prior set of questions which must be considered 
before we get to this point.  It is the purpose of this paper to consider a number 
of these prior issues, within the context of debates which are specific to the 
social and human sciences. 
 
The present inquiry is in a long tradition linking legal and evolutionary theory, 
which predates the writings of Charles Darwin.  Legal doctrinal thought, along 
with political economy, formed part of the intellectual climate from which 
modern evolutionary theory emerged in the mid-nineteenth century.
8  After the 
appearance of The Origin of Species in 1859,
9 Oliver Wendell Holmes
10 and 
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Arthur Corbin
11 were among those who used Darwinian ideas of natural 
selection to explain the mutation of legal concepts and the selective survival of 
legal precedents.  This line of thought was submerged for much of the twentieth 
century, but a version of it resurfaced during the 1970s in the context of the ‘law 
and economics’ movement.
12 More recently, legal change has again been 
described in explicitly evolutionary terms, through the notions of autopoiesis
13 
and path dependence.
14   
 
Law, then, offers a potentially fruitful field in which to test the recent claims of 
memetics.  Nor is this about the simple transplantation of ideas from biology to 
the social sciences.  The notions of bounded rationality and conventions, which 
originated in organization theory and the economics of law, are increasingly 
being used by biologists to explain the persistence of behavioural traits and 
regularities.
15 There is every possibility of developing a genuinely cross-
disciplinary exchange and synthesis of ideas. 
 
Against this background, the present paper will argue in favour of an 
evolutionary theory of legal change which rests on three related propositions.  
The first is that legal evolution is cumulative: incremental mutations in legal 
forms, when coupled with the selective effect of environmental pressures, can 
give rise to complex, multi-functional legal institutions.  Secondly, legal forms 
are adaptive without being optimal.  They reflect an internal dynamic of change 
which is shaped by historical conditions, rather than predestined convergence on 
a single, uniquely efficient form or ‘evolutionary peak’. Thirdly, legal evolution 
operates through a process analogous to inheritance in the biological sphere, 
which involves the vertical transmission of stored information. More 
specifically, it will be argued that it is useful to think of legal concepts as 
memes which store and ‘code’ information about social adaptations in a way 
which parallels the form and function of the genetic code, and that, by doing so, 
we will be able to throw new light on some enduring questions in the legal 
evolution debate. 
 
The argument will proceed as follows.  The next section outlines the meaning of 
the ‘evolutionary algorithm’ of natural selection and discusses how it may 
operate in a social or cultural context.  Some illustrations of evolutionary effects 
such as ‘frozen accidents’ and ‘QWERTY phenomena’ within legal doctrine are 
then presented, drawing on studies of the historical development of the legal 
institution of the contract of employment. Next, the argument is extended 
beyond an internal legal account, in an attempt to explain the link between 
social conventions and legal norms in evolutionary terms. Theoretical claims are 
supported by further examples drawn from the law governing employment and 
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commercial contracts. A basis for applying the genetic metaphor to law is then 
suggested, and some implications are drawn out in terms of the social ontology 
of law, the methodology of ‘law and economics’ and socio-legal studies, and the 
consequences for the conduct of public policy. The paper ends with a wider 
reflection on the future of evolutionary thought in the social and human 
sciences. 
 
The Evolutionary Algorithm 
 
Darwin’s objective in The Origin of Species was to show how speciation, or 
diversity in the natural world, occurs spontaneously through natural selection.  
Scarcity of resources leads to a competitive ‘struggle for life’. Where there is 
variation in the characteristics or traits which organisms inherit from their 
parents, those characteristics which aid survival and reproduction are more 
likely to be passed on to the next generation in their turn:   
 
‘Owing to this struggle for life, any variation, however slight and from whatever 
cause proceeding, if it be in any degree profitable to an individual of any 
species, in its infinitely complex relations to other organic beings and to 
external nature, will tend to the preservation of that individual. The offspring, 
also, will thus have a better chance of surviving’.
16   
 
With differential survival rates across successive generations, traits which are 
advantageous in this sense accumulate. By these means, an ‘invisible’, selective 
pressure is applied:  
 
‘natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing, throughout the world, 
every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving 
and adding up all that is good; silently and insensibly working, whenever 
and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of each organic 
being in relation to its organic, and inorganic, conditions of life’.  
17 
 
Speciation typically occurs when differences in environmental conditions act on 
the selective process to bring about divergencies in the line of descent.  The 
‘environment’, for this purpose, consists of the physical features of the natural 
world (topography, weather, and so on) and the activities of other organisms.  
Separation of the members of a single species, the result of migration or of 
changes in the landscape, can lead over time to the emergence of new species as 
each group adapts to new conditions.  This type of selection, unless unchecked, 
will carry on producing greater diversity over time, in part because, once two 
separate lines of descent have emerged, it is not normally possible for them to 
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recombine.
18 Moreover, diversity across species is self-reinforcing since it 
allows more efficient use of the limited resources available for life: ‘more living 
beings can be supported on the same area the more they diverge in structure, 
habits and constitution’.  The distinctive forms which emerge in this way are all 
‘fitted’ or ‘adapted’ to their environment, in the sense that the features which 
they possess have co-evolved with those of their surroundings (which, in the 
case of any one species, includes the relevant features of others with which it 
co-exists).  This coexistence of different species suggests that multiple 
‘solutions’ to the problem of adaptation to environmental conditions are 
possible. 
 
The contribution of modern genetics to evolutionary theory has been to identify 
the precise way in which inheritance and variation occur.  Inheritance takes 
place through the copying of the genetic code from parent to offspring.  Genetic 
material has a particular chemical composition (DNA) which makes this cross-
generational copying possible. Genes are therefore ‘replicators’ or self-
replicating entities which copy themselves with an extremely high degree of 
fidelity. At the same time, some mistakes in the copying process are possible.  It 
is through random mutations in the genetic composition of individual organisms 
and their recombination through reproduction that variation in inherited traits 
across a population of individuals takes place.   
 
Genetic material is literally a form of stored and coded information.
19 The 
genetic code – the ‘genotype’ (the term ‘genome’ is used to refer to a complex 
of genes) – contains information which is ‘encoded’ in sense of embodying 
previous adaptations or successful ‘survival strategies’. It is then ‘read’ by an 
organism in the particular environment in which it finds itself.  More precisely, 
the DNA ‘code’ transmits information to proteins in such a way as to enable 
them to ‘build’ the organism which then becomes the carrier or vehicle for the 
further replication of the genetic material through reproduction (the term 
‘phenotype’ refers to the physical characteristics of organisms in this sense).  As 
this process continues, the effect of natural selection is expressed through shifts 
in the genetic composition of particular species.  As a result, it has been said 
that ‘the process of natural selection is one of extracting useful information 
from the environment and encoding it in the genes’.
20   
 
In place of the initial two-fold distinction between organism and environment, 
we now have a three-fold distinction between genotype (‘code’), phenotype 
(‘organism’) and environment. The introduction of the first element vitally 
clarifies the nature of the links between the other two.  Information concerning 
the environment’s past is embedded in the organism through the presence of the 
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code. It is in this sense that the organism and the environment are ‘fitted’ to 
each other. Selective pressures from the environment lead over time to changes 
in the composition of the code which in turn informs the structure of the 
organism. However, this occurs through the differential survival rates of the 
individual organisms which carry the code and make it possible for it to be 
reproduced. The ‘instructions’ contained in the code can only be altered 
‘blindly’ or non-teleologically, through the incremental processes of inter-
generational transmission and selective retention.   
 
It follows that observed variations in the characteristics of different organisms 
do not represent the impact of immediate environmental pressures; rather, they 
are the consequence of the inherited, cumulative effects of environmental 
change over successive generations. This is the essence of the distinction 
between ‘Lamarckian’ and ‘Darwinian’ conceptions of evolutionary change.
21  
In Lamarckian accounts of evolution, individual organisms respond with 
varying degree of effectiveness to environmental conditions. Traits which are 
‘acquired’ in this way are passed on by the more successful individuals to their 
offspring in such a way as to ensure that these more efficient characteristics 
endure. In the Darwinian account, by contrast, variation precedes selection. In 
the modern neo-Darwinian synthesis, variation is understood to be the result of 
essentially random mutations in the genetic code, ‘errors’ in the copying 
process. Those individual organisms which happen to be best fitted for 
adaptation in a given environment, as result of their genetic inheritance, are the 
most likely to survive and reproduce.   
 
The basic building blocks of evolutionary methodology are therefore the three-
fold division between code, organism, and environment, and the attribution of 
functional or adaptive properties to characteristics which persist through time.  
This methodology is not specific to biology. Within the context of the social 
sciences, it is possible to substitute ‘social system’ for ‘organism’, and the 
‘institutional’ or ‘cultural’ environment for the natural one.
22 Moreover, the 
‘evolutionary algorithm’ of natural selection can also be stated at a sufficiently 
general level to apply to the social sphere. The algorithm predicts that where 
four conditions are observed – (1) self-replicating entities, (2) a mechanism of 
variation, (3) a mechanism for inheritance, or the inter-generational 
transmission of entities, and (4) differential survival rates brought about through 
environmental pressures – a process of cumulative evolution, leading to the 
emergence of complex, diverse forms, will occur. How far is this algorithm 
applicable to legal evolution?   
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Legal Genealogies: QWERTY Phenomena and ‘Frozen Accidents’ 
 
A widely-followed approach in applying the evolutionary algorithm in the 
social or cultural sphere is to try to identify potential candidates for individual 
‘memes’ in the sense of units or entities which are equivalent to the gene.   
According to some authors, a  ‘meme’ must be capable of copying itself with 
near-complete accuracy, with errors occurring in a manner similar to the 
random mutations which occur in the genetic code as a consequence of 
transmission through inheritance. Changes in memetic material must also occur 
‘blindly’ or spontaneously, rather than as the consequence of the volition of 
individual agents.  Even some of the principal supporters of memetics find it 
difficult to envisage these conditions being met.
23  In The Blind Watchmaker,
24 
Dawkins identified memes as memory items stored in the human brain, such as 
fashions, tunes, catch phrases and other, more complex verbal formulae, which 
were transmitted principally through imitation.
25 If memes were only memory 
items in this sense, it would seem that cultural evolution would have few of the 
features of biological evolution; change, rather than being slow and incremental, 
would potentially be extremely rapid; the copying of memes through imitation 
would be highly inaccurate (at least by comparison to genes), thereby 
threatening to bring about the disintegration of any ‘memetic code’; individual 
volition and intention would play a major part in the process of transmission, 
thereby giving it a Lamarckian aspect; and cultural change would be free of the 
features which confer upon biological evolution its genealogical character, in 




If these speculations have been discouraging for the emergent discipline of 
memetics, they stand in contrast to associations which have long been made 
between Darwinian  evolution and processes akin to lineal descent within legal 
doctrine.  The best known of these is Holmes’s account of legal mutations in the 
first few pages of The Common Law, published in 1881.  Holmes was concerned 
with the disjuncture between form and substance in the common law, and 
specifically with the different speeds at which the two appeared to evolve.   
Holmes argued that legal forms or concepts tend to persist long after the 
justification for them has been lost or forgotten, a process which he thought 
required ‘ingenious minds’ to discover new rationales for their existence.  Once 
a new ground of policy was found, ‘the rule adapts itself to the new reasons 
which have been found for it, and enters upon a new career. The old form 
receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the 
meaning which it has received’.
27  Holmes, like Darwin, was writing at a time 
when the nature of genetic processes of transmission was not understood.   
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However, the process he describes in The Common Law is not dissimilar to 
aspects of the modern neo-Darwinian synthesis in its account of ‘blind’ legal 
evolution occurring in an incremental, cumulative (but not necessarily 
progressive) fashion as the result of selective inheritance. 
 
The opportunistic adaptation of existing legal forms to new ends which Holmes 
highlighted has parallels in the concept of ‘bricolage’ which has entered the 
biological literature from social anthropology.
28 ‘Bricolage’ implies that 
innovation in design, rather than involving the construction of a new model 
from scratch, tends to make use of structures or devices which lie immediately 
to hand.  When a design feature is adapted from one use to another in this way, 
it remains embodied in the relevant structure long after its original function has 
disappeared.  It is also possible that a design feature which is an essentially 
accidental by-product of an earlier adaptation finds a new use in a changed 
environment.  The evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould has coined the 
term ‘exaptation’ to convey this second type of feature.  In both cases, 
‘adaptations’ and ‘exaptations’, evolution involves moving away from an 
existing, inherited set of capabilities, rather than moving towards a predestined, 
optimal state.
29  The power of history to shape the direction of evolution is also 
captured by the idea of ‘path dependence’ which derives from new institutional 
economics.  This stresses the sense in which structural features of an ‘exapted’ 
technology or practice may be ‘locked in’ by the high costs of switching to what 
appears to be a more efficient alternative.
30 
 
The QWERTY typewriter keyboard (to take the most discussed example) is 
thought to have acquired its distinctive layout as the result of the circumstances 
which accompanied the introduction and widespread use of manual typewriters 
in the late nineteenth century.  The keys on some of the early manual machines 
tended to jam when operated quickly.  As typists’ speeds increased, designers 
hit upon the idea of using a layout which would slow them down. The 
QWERTY layout, with its awkward features (the much-used letter ‘a’ being 
designated for the little finger of the left hand, for example), was the solution.  
With the advent of more advanced keyboard technology, culminating in 
electronic keyboards of today’s word processors, this aspect of the layout 
became otiose.  However, after a while, the QWERTY configuration acquired 
usefulness form the simple fact of its near-universal adoption as the standard 
English-language keyboard. Users benefited from the existence of a single 
layout which had to be learned just once.  At the same time the keyboard has 
certain ergonomic disadvantages; apparently more efficient alternatives have 
been tested and attempts made from time to time to market them.  However, 
these have not caught on. In part, the QWERTY is maintained by virtue of the 
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network effects of having become a standard: the costs of switching, for any 
individual user, are considerable, as long as all other users are continuing to use 
the existing model. If a new model or standard were to be developed, it is 
possible that its use would quickly spread, once a critical mass of users made 
the change. But for the time being, at least, the QWERTY seems to be just good 
enough to survive; it has at best a qualified efficiency.
31 
 
QWERTY phenomena are extremely widespread in legal doctrine.
32 One 
example is the legal institution or concept of vicarious liability, in the context of 
the liability of employers for torts of their employees.
33  It is generally accepted 
that the function of vicarious liability is to shift the responsibility for injuries 
and other losses arising from economic production on to the enterprise, which is 
not only better able to bear this risk than the individual worker (either directly 
or through insurance) but is also in a position to take steps to minimize future 
harms through the power of management to coordinate the production process.   
At the same time, it is clear that the institution of vicarious liability, at least as it 
operates in the English common law, is a far from ideal mechanism for 
performing this task.  What is needed is a form of ‘enterprise liability’ which 
attaches legal claims to the enterprise, understood as the productive entity.   
 
However, no such notion exists. While the precise origins of vicarious liability 
are somewhat obscure, it seems that it is an adaptation or exaptation of the 
ancient legal maxim of ‘he who acts through another is taken to have acted 
himself (qui facit per alium facit per se)’; that is, the employer, on whose behalf 
the employee is acting, is taken to have committed the tort which the employee 
also commits.  Most of the time, this works well enough in achieving the risk-
shifting and incentivising functions of an enterprise liability doctrine, but it 
breaks down completely in the situation where the employer chooses to join the 
employee to the action as a joint tortfeasor, and then seeks contribution from the 
employee.  In order for the employer to be vicariously as opposed to personally 
liable, the employee must commit a tort; and it follows that the employer can, if 
it chooses to (or, more precisely, its liability insurer chooses to), shift most of 
the relevant liability back on to the employee. When this happened, in Lister v. 
Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd.,
34 the House of Lords declined to take 
the necessary remedial step, and bar the employer’s action by reference to an 
implied term in the contract of employment; as a result, the whole structure of 
employers’ liability law was placed in jeopardy. It was only saved by the 
expedient of a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ among insurance companies not to seek 
contribution from employees in these circumstances.
35 
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The example of vicarious liability indicates the ‘qualified efficiency’ or sub-
optimal nature of opportunistic adaptations or exaptations; there is a potential 
cost to making do with what lies to hand. Another example from the law of 
employers’ liability illustrates the potential for what in biology are called 
‘frozen accidents’.
36 These are structural features which are difficult to explain 
by reference to existing environmental conditions, but which can be seen to 
reflect adaptations to previous environments. The functional approach of 
Darwinism implies that the persistence of certain traits at the expense of others 
is a product of adaptation to environmental change. In principle, ‘any 
functioning structure carries implicit information about the environment in 
which its function works’.
37  But when we take account of the principle of lineal 
descent, this means that structures embody information not so much about the 
environment of the present, as those of the past. 
 
In English law, the tort of breach of statutory duty appears to be an anomalous 
addendum to the general law of negligence.
38 An employer is taken to have 
committed a tort where it breaks a duty imposed by a regulatory and/or criminal 
statute, under circumstances where damage results to a person who is within the 
range of the ‘class of plaintiffs’ protected by the statute. The tests for divining 
when a particular statute tacitly gives rise to this form of civil liability are 
notoriously unclear. The case law can be read as implying that no duty will arise 
unless the relationship between the parties, and the type of damage suffered, 
bring the case within the scope of the concept of duty of care in the law of 
general negligence. In other systems it is more clearly recognized that the 
purpose of the statute is to clarify what amounts to breach of duty, that is, what 
amounts to careless conduct, in circumstances where the law separately admits 
the existence of a duty of care (or its equivalent).
39 However, this is not the test 
which the English courts have articulated.  Nor are they in a position to do so, 
given the insistence that breach of statutory duty is a tort in its own right, apart 
from the tort of negligence.   
 
This anomaly occurs because the tort of breach of statute is an historical 
accident. The modern tort of breach of statutory duty was a late nineteenth 
century innovation which emerged as a way round an otherwise impassable 
obstacle to workers suing their employers for injuries sustained at work.  This 
was the defence of ‘common employment’. From the 1830s onwards, the higher 
courts had insisted that in an action based on the employer’s vicarious liability 
for the tort of one worker against another, the plaintiff would be defeated by the 
defence that he impliedly consented to run the risk of negligence by a fellow 
worker.  This defence was held to have no application, however, to the situation 
in which the employer’s wrong was not based upon his vicarious liability for the 
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tort of one of his workers, but upon his own ‘personal’ breach of a statute 
imposing obligations to have regard to the health and safety of workers. In 
1948, the defence of common employment was abolished by statute.
40  
However, it was too late by then to re-integrate the tort of breach of statutory 
duty into that of general negligence, and the separation of the two torts remains 
in place to this day. 
 
It may be objected that the legal doctrines of vicarious liability and breach of 
statutory duty are to some degree, at least, the product of intentional, ordered 
design. It is true that they appear to us now to have certain qualities of 
systematic organization, and that individual judges can, in some instances, lay 
claim to the authorship of particular doctrinal innovations. However, a generally 
accepted assessment is that ‘vicarious liability is the creation of many judges 
who have had different ideas of its justification or social policy, or no idea at 
all’.
41  The appearance of order is largely the work of treatise writers and others 
whose job is precisely to systematise and classify what would otherwise be a 
disparate body of legal materials. Moreover, this process of systematization 
takes place almost entirely after the event.   
 
The widespread and unavoidable practice of providing after-the-event 
rationalizations to doctrinal innovations often obscures the historical process by 
which they were formed.  A ‘genealogical’ analysis, by revealing this process, 
can also throw light on the inherited constraints, but also the capabilities, of 
legal concepts.  An analysis of the origins of the concept of the contract of 
employment indicates what is possible from this kind of methodology.
42 The 
modern contract of employment has a complex, multi-functional character. On 
the one hand, it provides a doctrinal basis for the exercise of many of those 
powers of the employer which in an extra-legal sense are described as 
‘managerial prerogative’, that is to say, the power to coordinate the activities of 
a group of workers and to direct and control the pace of production.  On the 
other hand, the same concept of the contract of employment is used in the 
context of modern social legislation to define those employment relationships 
which are regulated by employment protection law, and which are subjected to 
specialized regimes of fiscal and social security law. The device may therefore 
be thought of as serving a dual function: it underpins the hierarchical structure 
of the enterprise, while also providing the basis for the risk-shifting and 
redistributive functions of the welfare state. 
 
Needless to say, these two roles do not always operate in harmony with each 
other, and much of the dissatisfaction which is expressed in relation to the 
doctrinal structure of the contract of employment derives from precisely this 
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tension.
43 The doctrinal shortcomings of the concept are easier to understand 
when the concept’s ‘line of descent’ is reconstructed. It then becomes clear that 
the modern employment contract has been superimposed on top of an older 
notion, the ‘master-servant’ relation, which had few of the features which 
compensate today’s employee for entering into a situation of personal and 
economic dependence upon the employer.
44 The key to understanding this 
process lies in the analysis of the legislation and case-law surrounding the terms 
‘servant’ and ‘employee’.   
 
At the mid-point of the twentieth century, it was believed that the prevailing legal 
concept for defining the employment relationship during the nineteenth century 
had been the ‘control’ test. Otto Kahn-Freund influentially suggested that the 
control test developed in the context of the common law relating to the employer’s 
vicarious liability for torts of a servant acting in the course of employment.
45  It is 
certainly true that, in the post-1945 period, this was one of the contexts in which 
the control test was still being applied. However, the nineteenth-century 
authorities which were (and are) cited for the ‘control’ test were not concerned 
with the issue of tortious liability. In part this was because, as we have already 
seen, actions by workers against their employers under the common law of tort 
were highly likely to fail because of the application of the defence of common 
employment, or through one of its allied defences, contributory negligence and 
consent.   
 
Close examination of origins of the concept of the contract of employment 
suggests that it was not the common law of vicarious liability which provided the 
context for the emergence of that concept, but, rather, social legislation dealing 
with taxation and national insurance. One of the most widely cited cases for the 
control test, Yewens v. Noakes,
46 concerned the definition of a live-in servant 
under tax legislation. This case did not turn on the distinction between 
‘employees’ and the ‘self-employed’ which is familiar to modern employment 
lawyers and which Kahn-Freund was writing about in the 1960s, nor even to the 
roughly equivalent nineteenth century distinction between ‘servants’ and 
‘independent contractors’. The court’s decision was based on its refusal to believe 
that a salaried clerk earning a substantial salary could be a ‘servant’, since, 
according to the court, such a person was more clearly akin to ‘the manager of a 
bank, a foreman with high wages, persons in the position almost of gentlemen’.  
Yewens v. Noakes, then, was not concerned with the modern distinction between 
employment and self-employment for which it is still, even today, being cited.  
Rather, it was concerned with a completely different status-based divide, that 
between ‘servants’ and labourers in manual employment, on the one hand, and 
those employed in higher-level occupations and managerial and clerical work, on 
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the other.  To see why this distinction was more important at that point than it is 
today, a now-vanished feature of the nineteenth century legal landscape must be 
borne in mind. The distinction between manual and non-manual work had been 
central to the operation of the nineteenth century master-servant legislation; only 
‘servants’ were subject to fines and imprisonment for breach of service contracts.  
This same distinction was carried over as a kind of ‘frozen accident’ into early 
social legislation concerning workmen’s compensation and social insurance.  It 
was in this context of the law of the emerging welfare state that the ‘control’ test 
was established in a series of early twentieth-century decisions.
47  
 
Why did twentieth-century courts light upon the otherwise obscure decision in 
Yewens v. Noakes? The (re)discovery and adaptation of the control test in the 
1900s and 1910s was a doctrinal innovation which was introduced at the same 
time as the courts were being called on to define the boundaries of what was then 
regulatory legislation of a wholly novel type. Nor was this judicial innovation 
particularly welcoming to the new legislation. The element of compulsion in 
social legislation went strongly against the grain of prevailing common law 
values. As a result, the courts regularly held that professional and managerial 
workers were outside the scope of these new laws.
48  The control test, as applied 
by twentieth century courts, was also linked to disputes about employer’s 
liability in the context of the widespread practice of internal contracting. The 
contract system of hiring labour through an intermediary was still the 
predominant form of industrial organisation in road building, construction, 
shipbuilding, mining and quarrying, and iron and steel.
49  The adoption of the 
control test enabled employers to avoid responsibility for the social risks of 
illness, injury and unemployment which it had been the aim of social legislation 
to impose, at least in part, upon them.  In short, the rise of the control test in the 
early years of the twentieth century tells us much about prevalent employment 
disputes at that time, about the clash between freedom of contract and the 
welfare state, and about shifts in the structure of the business enterprise which 
were also going on then. 
 
The ‘unitary’ model of the contract of employment which came to extend to all 
categories of wage-earners, including salaried and clerical workers, was only 
clearly adopted when further reforms were enacted to social legislation, in 
particular the extension of social insurance which took place in the National 
Insurance Act 1946,
50 and when the internal contracting system gave way to 
integrated management, a development which in some industries, such as coal 
mining, occurred as late as the post-war nationalization process.  A major aspect 
of the Beveridge Report of 1944 was the abolition of distinctions between 
different categories of employees: henceforth, all wage or salary earners, 
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regardless of their annual income or of their professional status, would come 
under the same contributory classification.
51  It was in the context of this new 
situation that the courts abandoned the old distinction between low status and 
high status employees when seeking to define the contract of service.
52 The 
control test itself came to be regarded as excessively artificial, and gave way to 
the more recognizably modern tests of ‘integration’ and ‘business reality’. At 
around the same time, the term ‘servant’ mutated into the modern ‘employee’.  
By these means, a more inclusive notion of the employment relationship came 
to be established for the purposes of determining the scope of employers’ 
liabilities in respect of personal injuries, employment protection and social 
insurance. 
 
The interpretation of terms in now-repealed statutes on employers’ liability and 
workmen’s compensation reveals at the micro-level of doctrinal analysis how 
changing labour market conventions were reflected in the law in the period from 
the rise of the modern industrial economy to the advent of the welfare state.  
This occurred in a way which was very far from removed from the linear 
movement of status to contract which Maine had influentially suggested as the 
basis for legal evolution at the high point of mid-Victorian laissez faire;
53 nor is 
the more recent metaphor of the ‘rise and fall of freedom of contract’
54 any 
more appropriate in this context. What is striking is the continuity of contract 
throughout this period as a point of reference as a series of mutations occurred 
in legal definitions of the employment relationship. Through shifts in conceptual 
form, the notion of the contract of employment emerged by way of response to 
the rise of the welfare state and integrated business enterprise.  Mutations in 
legal forms were therefore the result of a complex interplay of social, economic 
and political forces. Long periods of relative stasis alternated with intervals of 
rapid innovation, often triggered by legislative intervention in a pattern 
reminiscent of ‘punctuated equilibrium’.
55 Uneven rates of development and 
discontinuities brought about by exogenous shocks, rather than continuous, 
linear adjustment to an external environment, characterized the path of legal 
change. 
 
There is a resonance here with what we know about the genetic code. The 
genome has been described as ‘an information-processing computer that 
extracts useful information from the world by natural selection and embodies 
that information in its design… you can look on the human genome as four 
billion years’ worth of accumulated learning’.
56  In the same way, legal concepts 
– the linguistic formulae which provide the basis for the systematisation of legal 
material – can be thought of as embodying in shorthand form information about 
the social world which is filtered through the processes of legal argument and 
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exposition.  Like the genetic code, legal concepts change slowly, by comparison 
to the more rapid rate of change in the substance of legal rules, and in a way 
which is often only apparent in retrospect, mirroring the non-teleological and 
path-dependent aspect of genetic change.  Just as the genome’s ability to copy 
itself faithfully provides the necessary condition for inheritance of the 
information contained in the genetic code, so it is the relative continuity of the 
‘legal code’ which makes it possible for the vertical, inter-temporal transmission 
of the information which it contains to take place. If, in general, ‘cultural 
evolution is not possible until there are sufficiently powerful information-
processing devices capable of storing information and reliably transmitting it to 
or replicating it in other information-processing devices’,
57 then legal doctrine is 
one such repository. 
 
Conventions, Social Learning, and Legal ‘Coding’ 
 
So far we have been looking at mutations within the internal discourse of legal 
concepts. A wider perspective makes it possible to examine the processes by 
which information from the social realm is embedded in the legal ‘code’ in the 
first place. This involves a consideration of evolutionary theories concerning the 
emergence of social norms and conventions, and their link to law. 
 
‘Conventions’ have been defined as units of shared information which provide a 
basis for coordinating the actions of individual agents,
58 a definition which, for 
present purposes, usefully stresses their potentially memetic character. The 
function of conventions in facilitating coordination is illustrated in game theory 
by simple models of games of pure coordination and equilibrium selection.  In a 
game of pure coordination, for either party, achieving a high pay off depends 
entirely on being able to predict what the other party will do. However, the 
environment is such that the criterion of individual rationality provides no 
reliable guide to action.   
 
The paradigm case is that of two drivers facing each other on the road in a 
foreign country for the first time. There are two possible equilibria here: (left, 
left) and (right, right). They are both as good as each other in terms of the pay-
offs to the players as individuals, and in terms of the aggregate well being of the 
players. Neither driver has any grounds for knowing whether the other will 
choose to drive on the left or on the right.  If, however, the convention ‘drive on 
the left’ (or, as the case may be, ‘drive on the right’) is known to both, the 
parties can achieve a high (coordinated) pay-off and avoid a low 
(uncoordinated) one (see figure 1). 
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Figure 1: game of pure coordination (the pay-offs to each player are expressed 
as (row, column)) 
 
  Left 
 
Right 










By contrast, other games present multiple equilibria with differing properties.  
The function of conventions here is to shift the parties’ strategies from a sub-
optimal outcome to one which enhances their joint well being.  In the well-
known prisoners’ dilemma game (figure 2),
59 it is individually rational for each 
party to ‘defect’, that is, to decline to cooperate.   
 
 
Figure 2: prisoners’ dilemma (the players’ pay-offs are expressed as (row, 
column)) 
 
  Cooperate 
 
Defect 
Cooperate  2, 2 
 
0, 3 





This expectation is rational since, for any given player, the strategy ‘defect’ 
results in a superior individual pay-off to the strategy ‘cooperate’, whatever the 
other player does.  This is the inevitable result of the way in which the 
prisoners’ dilemma game is set up.  The environment in which the players find 
themselves is such that a sub-optimal outcome is sure to occur if each individual 
acts according to his or her own self-interest; hence, the outcome of mutual 
defection is said to embody a unique ‘Nash equilibrium’ or stable state.
60  Other 
games can be imagined in which no such single strategy is dominant; outcomes 
necessarily depend on how the pay-offs are arranged. The prisoners’ dilemma is 
no more ‘realistic’ than these alternative games. The interest of the prisoners’ 
dilemma lies not in any realism which it may possess, but in the possibility it 
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provides for exploring the dynamics of a situation in which the expression of 
individual self-interest is radically opposed to the collective good.   
 
It is futile to insist that the players in the prisoners’ dilemma surely must 
cooperate, since by doing so they could shift the outcome from a sub-optimal 
equilibrium (defect, defect) to a manifestly superior one (cooperate, cooperate).   
This would simply represent a different, and arguably less interesting, game, 
one in which the conflict between individual and collective well being had been 
somehow abolished. This could be achieved by changing the background 
assumptions in some way, for example by making it possible for the parties to 
make a legally binding contract which was perfectly enforceable, or by altering 
their preferences so that the well being of each one was interdependent with that 
of the other. These changes could be incorporated into the game by changes to 
the structure of pay-offs.   
 
However, the point of the prisoner’s dilemma is precisely that it asks us to 
consider whether cooperation can arise in a state of nature where the possibility 
of legal enforcement does not exist. Under these unpromising circumstances, 
can it be shown that conventions which support cooperation are capable of 
emerging endogenously, that is to say, on the basis of nothing more than the 
bare ingredients of the interaction inscribed by the ‘rules’ of that particular 
game?  The basic insight here is that spontaneous cooperation can emerge if the 
game is played more than once, thereby giving rise to the possibility of 
defection in one round being punished in the next.  More precisely, if the game 
is played indefinitely, a fragile but stable basis for cooperation may be 
established.  If, on the other hand, both parties know the end point of the game, 
this form of cooperation begins to fall apart, since, by backwards induction, it 
becomes rational to defect not only in the final round (when the threat of 
retaliatory punishment has become meaningless) but, in anticipation of what 
will happen then, in all previous rounds. 
 
Cooperation is not inevitable in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma.  On the 
contrary, it is just one of a number of equilibria which have been identified as 
being technically possible when this game is played.
61  Which equilibrium the 
parties arrive at depends on how far they play ‘mixed strategies’ (randomly 
altering their strategies over time), on the degree of error in their responses, and 
in the timing of these variations.   To make further progress in understanding the 
origins of cooperation, it is necessary to introduce the notion of ‘bounded 
rationality’ which is at the heart of evolutionary game theory.   In the model of 
the prisoners’ dilemma which we have been considering so far, the actors have 
been endowed with ‘hyper-rationality’ or an unconstrained ability to foresee and 
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predict each other’s behavioural responses.  In bounded rationality models, by 
contrast, their ability to foresee the future is assumed to be constrained by limits 
upon their knowledge and computational capacity.  The purpose of making this 
assumption is to model games in which strategies can be learned through 
processes of imitation, observation and social interaction. 
 
An essential part of these models is the idea of the ‘evolutionarily stable 
strategy’ or ESS.  An ESS is a type of Nash equilibrium that sustains itself 
against alternatives under particular conditions.  When the strategy is played by 
a certain critical mass of a given population of players, it becomes impervious 
to ‘invasion’.
62  Robert Axelrod’s computer simulations, described in his 1984 
book  The Evolution of Cooperation,
63 found that the ‘naïve reciprocator’ 
strategy of tit-for-tat was an ESS which thrived against alternative strategies in 
the sense just described.  In tit-for-tat, one player cooperates until such time as 
the other player defects, and then subsequently binds his or her strategy to 
whatever their opponent has just done.  Once this pattern becomes established, 
the players’ expectations become self-reinforcing, and a convention is 
established.  Tit-for-tat is not a unique ESS in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma, 
and studies have shown that it is almost certainly not the best conceivable 
strategy for that game.
64  However, the fundamental insight that reciprocity 
holds one of the keys to understanding the emergence and persistence of 
cooperation and hence, in an extended sense, of social order, has an obvious 
resonance with empirical studies in a number of disciplines ranging from the 
study of animal behaviour to human anthropology.  It also has clear importance 
for the study of contract law, where the importance of reciprocity has long been 
recognised in both the empirical and theoretical strands of relational contract 
writing.
65   
 
The term ‘reciprocal altruism’, which was originally applied in evolutionary 
biology but has since entered wider use, describes a range of behaviour 
embodying tit-for-tat and related strategies.
66  The term is somewhat misleading, 
since its conception of ‘altruism’ is firmly rooted in individual self interest.   
Equally, the idea of ‘gift exchange’ with which it is associated can give the false 
impression that the process of transfer of resources is in some way gratuitous, 
when the opposite is the case.  ‘Reciprocal altruism’, so-called, implies that one 
party incurs a cost in order to confer a benefit on another, in the expectation that 
he or she will receive a benefit back in return at some future point.  Repeated 
interactions and stable relations through time thus provide the basic conditions 
for the practice to develop.  In addition, there must be the possibility of 
‘punishment’ for those who do not reciprocate the gains they have received, if 
only in the form of their exclusion from future trades.   
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The argument that reciprocal altruism generates a surplus which confers an 
evolutionary advantage on those groups which pursue this practice lies at the 
basis of the claim that some species, including human beings, are ‘hard wired’ 
to engage in this practice.
67 However, an alternative (if possibly 
complementary) hypothesis must be considered, namely that the emergence of 
reciprocal altruism and similar practices has been informed by a memetic 
process operating at the level of social evolution. Viewed from a memetic 
perspective, the effectiveness of a convention is a function of how widely it is 
observed and imitated, and this, in turn, depends on how well the practice which 
it embodies can be copied.  A purely behavioural explanation may take us part 
of the way in understanding how it is that certain conventions become 
established and, in turn, how they are destabilised.  This is the case with H. 
Peyton Young’s pared down model for the emergence of road traffic 
conventions.
68  In a world of agents acting with bounded rationality, an 
individual’s decision to drive on the left or the right hand side of the road is a 
function of what he or she observes other drivers doing. On this basis, a well 
established practice can tip over to its opposite, depending on the extent of the 
memory of individual drivers and their propensity for random error. This is an 
illustration of the role played by information and norm ‘cascades’: the 
persistence of conventions is linked to the number of agents following them 
because the pay-off increases the more agents follow the convention.
69  
 
Social learning, then, involves a feedback mechanism through which particular 
practices become self-reinforcing. Through copying what others do, agents 
move towards conventions which are more successful without the need to know 
exactly why the practice in question works for the best.  In a positive transaction 
cost world, conventions save on the transactions costs of continually searching 
for the ‘right’ solution.
70 The process is one of  ‘blind’ evolution because no one 
knows in advance that they are setting off on a ‘superior path’; by definition, the 
path becomes ‘superior’ only in the light of what happens later.
71   
 
Empirical studies have apparently shown that a form of social learning of this 
sort, involving ‘order without law’, can emerge on the basis of shared 
understandings among a relatively stable and homogenous group of actors, to 
the extent of rendering formal legal rules redundant or ineffective.
72 However, 
the diffusion of information concerning solutions to coordination problems on 
the basis of imitation and observation alone is a slow and often haphazard 
process.  In this context, it seem that an important function of the legal system is 
to standardise and transmit complex information in such a way as to make it 
possible to widen the basis for trade beyond localised communities, thereby 
extending the scope of the division of labour. The impact of legal rules and 
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sanctions may not necessarily be felt directly by the majority of economic 
agents, but comparative, empirical evidence suggests that the legal framework 
or ‘architecture’ of norms
73 may play a role in shaping the environment within 
which particular forms of economic cooperation emerge, to the extent that 
differences between systems at the level of legal norms are reflected in 
variations in contractual practice and vice versa. 
 
This was one of the findings of the Cambridge study of inter-firm contracting 
which was carried out in the mid-1990s and which compared, among other 
things, legal and commercial practice in Britain and Germany.
74  In Germany, a 
major role is played at the doctrinal level by article 242 of the German Civil 
Code, which embodies a principle of good faith (Trau und Glauben) in 
contracts, including ‘arms-length’, commercial transactions.  Article 242 
acquired its current meaning largely as a result of shifts in judicial interpretation 
of commercial contracts, the most important of which occurred during the 1920s 
when the courts had to deal with the consequence of hyper-inflation on long-
term agreements. It was in this context that article 242 was interpreted as 
requiring parties to renegotiate long-term contracts which are subject to an 
unanticipated event, such as an unexpected rise in prices or fall in demand, in such 
a way as to go far beyond what would normally be permitted by the common law 
doctrine of frustration, which relieves the parties from future performance but 
only in a much more restricted range of circumstances.
75  Article 242 and the good 
faith principle which it embodies represent a particularly explicit and elaborated 
formulation of the values of reciprocity in commercial relations.  A commentator 
on article 242 has said that it has the role of ‘giving legal force to broad ethical 
values’.
76 By contrast, the English courts have, notoriously, refused to 
countenance a general principle of good faith in commercial contracts, preferring 
to stress the autonomy of parties dealing ‘at arms’ length’.
77 
 
The Cambridge study found that the role of article 242 is not a purely rhetorical 
one; its influence is felt at the level of contractual practice.  Three levels of 
contractual regulation are relevant here: the body of commercial contract law, 
which in infused by the values of reciprocity derived from article 242; the 
standard form agreements for commercial dealing which are laid down at industry 
level in Germany; and inter-party agreements at micro-level.  The different levels 
are closely linked.
78  Standard forms follow closely the guidance of the law on 
what amounted to performance in good faith; individual contracts, in turn, tend 
not to depart radically from the template set at industry level.  This is not to imply 
that the process of transmission is just one way, from the law down to the level of 
individual contracting; the process of litigation, which over a number of decades 
has resulted in several thousand decisions which have reported and digested, 
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ensures that information about what is occurring in commercial practice flows 
back up to the legal system, albeit in a form which is subject to selective 
pressures. 
 
There is a considerable contrast here with English commercial law and practice.  
Parties are very much ‘free to make their own agreements’ in the absence of an 
overarching principle of good faith and relatively weak industry-level standard 
terms.  During the period of the research referred to, in the mid-1990s, standard 
form contracts were disintegrating in the industries being studied, as a result of the 
privatisation of coal, gas and electricity.  Monopsony buyers, in the form of the 
old nationalised state corporations, had performed a similar role to trade 
associations in Germany in ensuring that standardised contract terms were 
followed.  With their departure from the scene, long-established terms dealing 
with the allocation of risk between main contractors and sub-contractors were 
swept aside in favour of agreements which shifted the risk almost entirely on to 
the latter, reflecting the new balance of economic power. 
 
In the German context, article 242 embodies an equilibrium-shifting convention 
which seeks to inform the process of contractual coordination across a wide range 
of commercial and consumer transactions. Its persistence through time implies 
that it has become adapted to certain features of the legal and commercial 
environment in Germany; it is both a reflection of widespread contractual practice, 
and a framing influence on the development of contractual behaviour in that 
jurisdiction.  Information circulates between the legal system and the economic 
system in such a way as to create a form of ‘feedback’ or reciprocal 
reinforcement. This leads in turn to a type of institutional lock-in in which 
economic relations of a certain type – generally those involving a long time 
horizon – tend to prevail over others.  In the English context, by contrast, the lack 
of a legal principle similar in nature to Article 242 does not mean that there is no 
lock-in effect; there is an effect, but it simply has a different content.  The notion 
of ‘arms-length dealing’ between commercial parties becomes a norm in practice, 
as well as a focal point for judicial pronouncements.  Short-term time horizons are 
common, with the parties exploiting shifts in the terms of trade to press home a 
contractual advantage.  In each jurisdiction, then, a particular form of economic 
behaviour has co-evolved with a certain type of legal discourse. 
 
Thus in the case of rules of commercial law governing inter-firm contracting, 
legal concepts ‘code for’ information relating to means of solving coordination 
problems in this particular setting. Both litigation and legislation are means by 
which this information is collected. Litigants, in the context of case law, and 
interest groups pressing for statutory change, are akin to ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
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who subsidise the process of discovery of new rules for the benefit of society as 
a whole, in return for the possibility of being the first to exploit a novel 
principle, or ‘repeat players’ who amortise current costs against expected future 
gains.
79  Both adjudication and legislation, in addition to holding out the 
prospect of immediate returns, create public goods in the sense of providing 
guidance for conduct in the future.  An essential step in this process is the kind 
of encoding which occurs through abstraction, or the translation of particular 
rules (‘pay on time’) into broader conceptual or dogmatic legal categories 
(‘good faith’).  The process also works in reverse: the principles contained in 
concepts are applied in concrete settings through a form of contextual decoding 
which informs the content of particular rules.
80  In both cases, the task is not 
confined to judges and drafters, but is shared by the entire legal community, 
including practitioners responsible for developing the terms of standard-from 
agreements and precedents.  In this context interpretation, rather than imitation, 
is the essence of legal transmission.  With this emergence of law as a specific 
interpretive practice, legal doctrine acquires the autonomous and self-referential 
character which it needs to ensure its own replication, or self-reproduction.
81   
 
Moving beyond Metaphor? 
 
We are now in a position to return to the genetic metaphor with which we 
began, and to see how legal evolution can be effectively understood in memetic 
terms.  In this context, legal doctrine can be thought of as a  particular 
mechanism of cultural transmission which works by coding information into 
conceptual form, thereby assisting its inter-temporal dissemination.  The 
mechanism involved is essentially ‘Darwinian’ in nature, in the sense of 
operating through a cycle of inheritance, variation and selection.  Legal 
discourse possesses elements of autonomy and self-reference which provide it 
with the capacity for self-replication, while at the same time that it is linked to 
wider social and biological processes through co-evolution.  Legal concepts are 
the equivalent of genetic replicators, with substantive rules or norms operating 
as interactors.
82   This division mirrors a broader one in the social realm: 
memetic material (shared values, assumptions and heuristic categories) is 
embodied in the practice of institutions, understood as assemblages of rules, 
norms and conventions (see figure 3).   
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Figure 3: units of biological, social and legal evolution 
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Inheritance occurs through the replication of concepts over time.  The unit of 
inheritance is the abstract concept or ‘legal meme’ which is carried forward at 
the point when one legal rule succeeds another.  The same process allows for a 
limited degree of variation. Variation in legal memes can be thought of as the 
result of experimentation by legal actors when faced with the need to adapt an 
existing rule to new circumstances.  In genetic evolution, small variations in the 
inherited characters of organisms are said to be the result of random errors in 
the copying of the genetic code.  In cultural evolution, the process is less clearly 
random; it could be said to be ‘smart’ in the sense of being guided by 
experience and precedent.
83   This idea helps to explain at one and the same time 
both the possibility of mutation through experimentation or error, and the high 
degree of fidelity which normally attends the copying process.  As we have seen 
from reviewing the history of the contract of employment, while the content of 
legal rules in an area such as employment may shift considerably from one 
period to another, below the surface there is a surprisingly high degree of 
conceptual continuity.  The conceptual form of the contract of employment has 
been reproduced in the context of successive statutes and judicial precedents, 
maintaining a continuing presence while the content of the rules themselves has 
in many cases been completely transformed. To illustrate this point with a 
further example: the most recent example of this process is the radical 
transformation of the employee’s ‘duty of obedience’ into a ‘duty of mutual 
trust and confidence’ between employer and employee, a process which, while 
stimulated by statutory change, has occurred entirely through the language of 
implied contract terms.
84  What is to account for conceptual continuity of this 
kind?  It would seem that the mechanism of inheritance is the legal system’s 
self-imposed rule of internal conceptual order, which requires that new legal 
norms refer back to known conceptual forms.  The conceptual content of the 
norm endows it with legitimacy in the context of the ‘self-referential’ operation 
of the legal order.  There are many illustrations of this principle of legal 
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consistency, the most obvious being the rules of precedent which confine the 
scope of legitimate judicial interpretations, and which it is the particular task of 
the appellate courts to monitor and enforce.  It is precisely such principles as the 
instruction that ‘like cases should be decided alike’ that ensure faithful copying 
most of the time, while also allowing certain scope for variations to emerge in 
response to novel fact situations.   
 
Legal concepts are of course replicated through the means of human agency.  
Judges and statutory drafters, among other legal actors, are key agents within 
this process.  But legal continuity of this kind is not simply a function of 
individual volition.  The options available to the judge or drafter are both 
informed and constrained by the existing ‘meme pool’ of legal forms.  The aim 
of adjudication or legislation is not to reproduce the concept as such; it is used 
only as a means to an end, that is, to develop a workable rule.  Yet this has the 
effect that a version of the ‘copy me’ instruction is written into the form of those 
highly abstract legal concepts (such as ‘contract’ or ‘employee’) whose very 
generality serves to make them essential at the point when innovation in the 
content of substantive rules occurs.  
 
The  unit of selection is the legal rule and the mechanisms through which 
selection operates are what Luhmann and Teubner refer to in a generic sense as 
legal procedures or processes.
85  The mechanism is ‘Darwinian’ in that variation 
precedes selection.  Variation in legal rules (the ‘phenotype’) is possible within 
the constraints posed by the search for coherence and continuity within legal 
doctrine (the ‘genotype’).   The rules which emerge from this process are 
subjected to selective pressures.  Lobbying, interest group activities, litigation 
strategies, and other forms of concerted intervention in the law-making process 
all have a potential role to play here.  The strongly selective effect of legal 
procedures ensures that in the case of litigation, for example, only certain 
disputes are litigated, only a fraction of these come before a court for decision, 
and only a further fraction in turn are reported and analysed in such a way as to 
establish precedents.  At every stage, those norms which do not ‘fit’ with their 
environment are implicitly selected against.  These procedures make it possible 
for the legal system to receive information about the attitudes, beliefs and values 
of members of a society on what passes for conventional or ‘reasonable’ 
behaviour.  Because the legal system then transmits this information back to 
society in the form of legal norms, there is a powerful ‘feedback loop’ operating 
between the legal order and the wider economic and social environment.  It is in 
this sense that the legal system and the wider institutions of the economy and 
society become ‘fitted’ to one another through co-evolution.   
 
 23   
In itself, this presentation of the genetic metaphor, while suggestive, is only 
useful if it offers new insights on legal evolution.  Three such insights may be 
suggested; they are concerned, respectively, with the ontological, 
methodological, and normative dimensions of this issue. 
 
The ontological dimension concerns the nature of legal reality and the status of 
legal norms, concepts, and processes as objects of study.  A purely internal, 
legal perspective does not offer, for this purpose, a viable account of how norms 
operate in the social or economic realm.  The law’s ‘self-description’ of its own 
operation (the explicit or implicit assumptions made in the form of legal norms 
about their own application) is of course no more than that.
86  Although this 
self-description is of interest in its own right, from both an internal, doctrinal 
and an external, sociological point of view, it does not provide a secure 
foundation for a socio-legal understanding of how law and society inter-relate.  
However, attempts to describe law in terms which are exclusively economic, for 
example, run the opposite risk of imposing an inappropriate conceptual 
framework which denies the distinctive social reality of legal phenomena. This 
is characteristic of the traditional law and economics analysis, which sees legal 
norms  exclusively in terms of implicit ‘signals’ or ‘prices’, or of game 
theoretical approaches which view the application of norms as nothing more 
than stable equilibria.
87  The evolutionary approach suggested here seems at 
first sight to imply an even more extreme form of reductionism in which legal 
forms are seen as driven by a sub-individual unit, a ‘selfish meme’, and in 
which biological laws dictate the nature of social institutions. 
 
On reflection, this criticism can be seen to be unjustified.  A memetic 
perspective should see social structures in general, and legal systems in 
particular, as ‘emergent’ orders with distinctive evolutionary dynamics of self-
reproduction and replication.  Emergence is a property according to which there 
is ‘a relationship between two features or aspects such that one arises out of the 
other and yet, while perhaps being capable of reacting back on it, remains 
causally and taxonomically irreducible to it’.
88   The evolutionary theory 
presented here offers us a way of thinking about law as emerging from the 
interactions of individual agents, in this sense, without being reducible to them.  
Memetic structures – shared information, conventions, ‘culture’ – cannot exist 
without human agency.  More specifically, it is self-evident that there can be no 
legal system without the conscious participation of human actors in its 
establishment and functioning.  However, the legal order represents more than 
the sum total of these interactions, at the same time as it represents more than 
the aggregated intentions of human actors involved in or affected by its 
operation.  This is because, once the legal order is established, it frames the 
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conditions for the exercise of human agency, just as much as it is framed by 
them.  This feedback effect provides the basis for the distinctive social ontology 
of law, and of memetic structures more generally.
89     
 
It further follows that, while the pattern and path of legal change may be subject 
to evolutionary mechanisms which share elements in common with those which 
govern biological evolution, legal evolution is not reducible to those same 
biological evolutionary processes.  Evolutionary psychology’s claim to have 
identified a direct link between genetic evolution and social structure must be 
seen in this light.  The existence of an evolutionary dynamic within human 
culture is not, without more, evidence that human beings are ‘hard wired’ 
through their genetic code in favour of certain behavioural dispositions, since 
part at least of this dynamic may equally well be explained by memetic, social-
structural processes which are distinct from (if at some level linked to) those of 
genetics.  The relationship between the genetic and cultural spheres should be 
understood as one of co-evolution, rather than linear cause and effect.
90   
Certain methodological implications follow from this point.  The evolutionary 
perspective presented here is necessarily functionalist, in the sense of seeing a 
link between function and form.  However, this is functionalism with an 
important qualification: existing forms contain significant elements of 
adaptation to past environments.  The information which is encoded in genes is 
information about how to build structures which were adaptive in environments 
encountered by our ancestors. Likewise with memes. Under these 
circumstances, the all-too-common step of imputing optimality to observed 
institutions simply on the basis of their persistence is not warranted.
91  As we 
have seen, to speak of fitness or even of the ‘survival of the fittest’ in the 
context of social institutions is simply to observe that these institutions have 
become ‘fitted to’ their environments over time.  It does not follow that these 
institutions are the best available; if anything, is strongly implies the opposite, 
namely that, through the amplifying effects of feedback between institutions and 
their environment, certain other paths, some of them beneficial, have been 
closed off.   
 
Under these circumstances, it is incorrect to assume that existing forms are fully 
functional with regard to existing environments.  They may possess enough 
functionality to survive, but they have not acquired the features which they now 
have by way of adaptation to current conditions; these have been inherited as a 
result of past adaptations.  Under these circumstances, a close inspection of the 
historical record – a ‘genealogical methodology’ – is required, with the aim of 
reconstructing the line of descent of institutional forms from an examination of 
the circumstances of their origins.  As we have seen from the examples given of 
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the evolution of the contract of employment earlier in this paper, such a 
reconstruction would often show that the development of forms is dependent 
upon contingencies and chance configurations of events.  It is interesting to note 
that, in this respect, studies of cultural evolution can afford to be more 
empirically orientated than their biological counterparts.  This is because ‘a 
fossil record of cultural change exists for our species that puts the biological 
fossil record to shame’; such a perspective implies, at the very least, ‘empirical 
research programmes in cultural evolution [which] must become as ambitious as 
research in biological evolution’.
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This in turn leads on to normative issues.  As we have noted at numerous points 
in this discussion, selection can only work through the feedback mechanism 
which operates through the code to link system and environment.  Mechanisms 
of social learning which provide for the horizontal transmission of knowledge 
undoubtedly exist.  It is evident, for example, that legal models are very 
frequently diffused by direct copying of concepts, as well as the content of 
rules.  The results are rarely straightforward, as a long tradition in comparative 
law has demonstrated.
93  Nor does the prevalence of this form of horizontal 
transmission undermine the suggestion that the vertical transmission of stored 
information through the legal system is subject to Darwinian processes; the 
inheritance of the adaptive knowledge contained in legal norms depends upon 
their being coded in conceptual forms.  Conversely, the capacity of the code to 
assimilate new information is limited by the need to ensure a high consistency 
in the copying process. This is a condition of its continued existence. Just as 
mechanisms have developed in the biological sphere for insulating the genetic 
code from external influences which would lead to its dilution and 
disintegration,
94 so ‘boundary conditions’ and ‘rules of recognition’ which 
determine which acts, processes and norms count as ‘legal’
95 perform the same 
function with regard to the legal system.  But the relative stability and 
continuity of legal concepts mean that legal evolution is, at any given point, out 
of synch with the process of social and economic change.   
 
In systems theory, the separation of the legal and social systems is expressed in 
a particularly radical form: the law is ‘operatively closed’ to the external 
environment, while being ‘cognitively open’. Operative closure is the 
consequence of law’s autonomy and self-referentiality; without it, the legal 
system would lack the capacity for evolutionary change. It is the inevitable 
consequence of the existence of legal boundary conditions. At the same time, 
cognitive openness implies the possibility that events occurring outside the legal 
systems can impact upon it if they are first translated into juridical language and 
processed through distinctively legal acts and procedures. However, the 
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immediate priority for the legal system is to produce a rule which ensures the 
need for consistency and order in the internal conceptual code, not one which 
conforms to external conditions. The legal system’s capacity for ‘translation’ is 
constrained by the inherited technology of existing conceptual structures.  
 
As Gunther Teubner insists, ‘autopoietic closure does not mean that the system 
is independent of its environment’.
96  What it does mean is that the legal order 
cannot be expected to respond directly to shifts in the social and economic 
environment.  This implies a degree of ‘asynchronic’ evolution at the level of 
the law-economy relation which goes beyond the predictions of path 
dependence theory, which suggests that cases of true ‘strong-form path 
dependence’, in which sub-optimal legal forms persist in the face of external 
environmental change, will be rare.
 97  On the contrary, we should expect to find 
that close alignment between the state of the law and that of the economy is the 
exception, not the rule. 
 
For this reason, we should be extremely sceptical of claims that spontaneous 
processes are likely to lead to the production of more efficient rules. But 
equally, the emphasis on ‘random’ mutation and ‘blind’ evolution in the legal 
system inevitably raises fears that an evolutionary conception of law must rule 
out certain types of active policy intervention.  Associated with this view is the 
critical account of legislative change which derives from the work of Hayek.   
Robert Sugden,
98 echoing Hayek,
99 suggests that ‘the system of common law is 
a spontaneous order, in which laws evolve as a result of the decisions of many 
different judges’.  The body of doctrine created by this process is more effective 
in adjusting to changing social circumstances, Sugden suggests, than is the case 
with explicitly worded legislation. Not only can legislation not ensure its own 
permanence (since bodies empowered to change laws by these means can also 
repeal them), but very precise legislation is more likely to need revision since 
‘no legislator can foresee all circumstances’.
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Yet this is plainly not the whole story. Legislation also encodes information 
about solutions to coordination problems. The legislative process collects 
information through processes of interest-group lobbying, public investigation, 
and parliamentary debate.  Like litigation, it contains elements of spontaneous 
order and is subject to selective processes by which certain rules are taken up 
and persist while others are discarded. In addition, legal rules derived from 
legislation also change over time without necessarily being formally repealed, 
thanks to judicial interpretations of statutes and codes. The widely-held 
misconception of the role of legislation among adherents of spontaneous order 
owes much to the belief that statutory rules are the product of conscious or 
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planned intervention, while those of the common law derive from the ‘blind’ 
interplay of litigation and adjudication. This contrast is too strongly drawn.  In 
both cases, conscious human agency is combined with elements of emergence. 
In many respects, legislation provides a form of information retrieval which is 
more broadly-based and open to a plurality of influence than the judge-made 
law has available through litigation, as the following example suggests:  
 
the prohibition on the use of land-mines has been under discussion world-wide. 
An international conference that convened to discuss this subject decided to 
propose a treaty banning such weapons, and the treaty might soon come into 
effect. The movement that launched this new rule of International Law was 
surely innovative, and must have involved deliberate foresight, but the process 
by which such potential innovation was transformed into international practice 
was one of extended social selection, involving information campaigns, social 
organisation and coalition-building, conference bargaining and negotiation, and 
has been and will be followed by voting in national assemblies and, ultimately, 
in national elections (an election campaign is the paradigmatic social-political 
selection process)…The fact of origin of such memes in individual or collective 
experience does not preclude the operation of social selection processes that 
ultimately add to, or subtract from, the world stock of memes.
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More generally, we may say that the use of evolutionary theory to minimise the 
role of active policy making is the result of too readily assuming that the state of 
the environment is exogenously determined and that existing forms must, 
therefore have adapted themselves efficiently to it.  This view is undermined 
once it is realised that the relationship between environment, system and code is 
not linear but cyclical.
102  In other words, the environment is constituted by the 
presence of the systems within it, and coevolves with them. In the case of 
memetic or cultural evolution, this implies that there is a complex relationship 
between conscious attempts to shape or construct the environment, the resulting 
selective pressures, and what are often unpredicted and unintended outcomes. It 
also means getting away from a deterministic ‘meme’s eye view’ of the world, 
in favour of a focus on the complex, multi-causal relations between systems and 
their environments. 
 
In evolutionary biology, this approach is associated with the concept of niche 
construction, which ‘occurs when an organism modifies the functional 
relationship between itself and its environment by actively changing one or 
more of the factors in its environment, either by physically perturbing these 
factors at its current address, or by relocating to a different address, thereby 
exposing itself to different factors’.
103  In the legal debate, this finds an echo in 
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the development of techniques which seek consciously to shape the 
environmental framework, with the aim of inducing desired ‘second-order 
effects’ on the part of social and economic actors. This so-called ‘reflexive law’ 
has increasingly come to the fore in the context of economic regulation over the 
past decade.
104 A technique which involves the legal rule ‘thinking about’ the 
conditions for its own application marks an advance on more traditional 
‘command and control’ mechanisms. It would seem that in the social sphere, as 
in the biological one, ‘evolvability’, or the capacity of systems to co-evolve in 
line with their environment, is itself an emergent property. With the advent of 
reflexive law, the possibility arises that learning about evolution itself will 




This paper has laid out the foundations of a memetic approach to law in which 
legal evolution is seen as a particular type of the general evolutionary algorithm 
first explained by Darwin and later developed into the foundation for modern 
evolutionary biology. The application of the genetic metaphor to law is 
plausible, if the search for memes focuses on the internal legal discourse of 
abstract concepts and forms. Legal concepts serve as a repository for 
information about social adaptation which is transmitted through the replication 
of forms in substantive legal rules. The continuity of the legal ‘code’ serves as 
both a capability and a constraint for judges, drafters and policy makers.  The 
lag between conceptual evolution and changes in social values means that 
concepts often appear to be ill-suited to contemporary circumstances. At the 
same time, legal innovation almost invariably takes the form of the adaptation 
or ‘exaptation’, to new contexts, of existing concepts.  The result is a degree of 
lock-in and sub-optimality in legal form and substance which produces 
discontinuities in the process of legal change, with legislative intervention 
frequently serving as a catalyst for periods of innovation in judge-made law.  
The outcome of such a process, in advance, is uncertain and unpredictable; it is 
only in retrospect, or from a comparative perspective, that it may be seen to 
result in a degree of ‘fit’ between legal rules and the wider social, economic and 
political environment.    
 
The normative implications of ‘fitness’, in this sense, need to be cautiously 
assessed.  Because code, systems and environment influence each other in a 
cyclical fashion, it is inappropriate to speak of institutions having survived 
because they have undergone a process of adjustment to an external 
environment.  Rather, legal rules co-evolve with other elements in the wider 
environment. While they may therefore reflect, in part, current social values and 
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economic forms, they also influence them.  Thanks to reciprocal reinforcement, 
contingent events can shape the path of legal and social evolution in ways which 
lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 
 
This paper has made a set of claims for evolutionary theory in the context of law 
which perhaps raise more questions than they answer.  This is appropriate for a 
preliminary investigation of this type, which envisages a process of deepening 
of understanding as more precise questions are identified for investigation.  As 
things stand, it is possible to map out a research programme in which these 
issues would be addressed.  This would include a search for a more complete 
understanding of the implicit structure of the legal conceptual ‘code’; historical 
studies tracing, more accurately than hitherto, the line of descent of legal forms; 
and more systematic inquiries into the interplay between legal development and 
economic change, with a view to understanding better the potential role of 
institutions of ‘structural coupling’ between systems. 
 
Beyond these objectives, there is the question of the wider implications of the 
growing use of evolutionary theory across the social and human sciences.  In the 
mid-nineteenth century, legal writers associated evolution with the idea of 
society’s progress through successive stages, culminating in the transition ‘from 
status to contract’;
105 in the second half of the twentieth century, evolutionary 
metaphors were used to attack the regulatory state and argue for a return to 
contract.
106  Neither of these views had much more than a very tenuous link 
with Darwinian thought.  At the beginning of a new century, as Darwin’s 
insights are being reassessed in a wide range of contexts, it is appropriate to ask 
what the wider normative significance of this process will turn out to be.  When 
claims can be made for the ‘end of history’ against a backdrop of legal 
globalisation,
107 it is all too easy to associate the apparent convergence of 
regulatory systems with mechanisms of economic selection.  By contrast, 
Darwin’s view, in The Origin of Species, was that the ‘grandeur’ of natural life 
lies in the ‘elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and 
dependent on each other in so complex a manner’
108 which are produced 
through natural selection.   For Darwin, diversity and interdependence were the 
basis for sustainability.  Perhaps here we will find the core of a humanistic 
theory of evolution for our own times.  
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